procedures that can help to define the means and ends of an occupation. Another is the involvement of international organizations, especially the United Nations, that can assist in setting or legitimizing certain transformative policies during an occupation.
The existence of a possible legal justification for pursuing transformative projects in military occupations might be thought to have two consequences, but neither of them follows automatically from it. Firstly, it is no basis for general optimism about transformative occupations. Law may allow for certain possible courses of action, but that does not mean that transformative goals are always desirable or attainable. Only in exceptional circumstances are occupations likely to bring about a successful democratic transition in a society. There is ample ground for scepticism about the propositions that democracy can be spread by the sword, and that the holding of multi-party elections is in itself evidence that a society is moving beyond authoritarianism.  Secondly, a legal framework for a transformative project under the jus in bello does not mean that, under the jus ad bellum, there can be said to be anything approaching a general right of states to invade other sovereign states with the stated purpose of reforming their political systems in a democratic direction. Since at least the time of the French Revolution of 1789 there have been many visions and projects of democratic transformative conquest. In contemporary international law a transformative political purpose is not on its own a justified cause for intervention.
The question of whether there can be a justification of intervention on transformative grounds overlaps with the long-standing and contentious question of 'humanitarian intervention'. There is a strong tradition of scepticism among international lawyers about whether, in the absence of a specific UN Security Council authorization, there can be said to be any 'right of humanitarian intervention'.  However, there is scope for a nuanced view that allows for some possibility of humanitarian intervention even without specific Security Council authorization. In such a view, it is neither logical nor helpful to frame the consideration of interventions in humanitarian crises in terms of a general 'right' of humanitarian intervention. Rather, humanitarian intervention is an occasional necessity, in which the legal issues on both sides are finely balanced, and in which states taking military action must accept a degree of legal risk. If it were to be accepted along such lines that on rare occasions intervention on humanitarian grounds might be justifiable, even without explicit UN Security Council authorization, 
